The Experimental Logic of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo by Speziale, Marcia J.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 77 | Issue 4 Article 4
1989
The Experimental Logic of Benjamin Nathan
Cardozo
Marcia J. Speziale
Harvard University
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Judges Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Speziale, Marcia J. (1989) "The Experimental Logic of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 77 : Iss. 4 , Article 4.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol77/iss4/4
The Experimental Logic of Benjamin
Nathan Cardozo*
By MARCIA J SPEZIALE**
INTRODUCTION
Benjamin Nathan Cardozo was an early-twentieth-century
jurist who, in his person, decisions, and writings, typified the
American philosopher-judge. His extrajudicial works contain dis-
cussions of the cases he decided while sitting on the New York
Court of Appeals-a renowned, forward-looking court, espe-
cially during the twenty years that Cardozo was a member. This
essay elucidates the philosophy poftrayed in Cardozo's writings
and recorded opinions. Particular emphasis will be given to his
philosophy of how law develops and the concomitant role of the
judge in the growth of the law
Cardozo's logic was "experimental" because he was meas-
urably influenced by John Dewey in his philosophy I In Logical
Method and Law,2 Dewey propounded an experimental logic of
modifiable hypotheses, which had, after Darwin, replaced a rigid
logic of fixed and immutable forms.3
Benjamin Cardozo often quoted Dewey in his books and
out-of-court addresses. 4 Dewey's influence is evident in Cardo-
* This essay was generated in Professor Donald Fleming's Intellectual History
Seminar at Harvard Umversity in the Fall of 1986. I thank Professor Fleming and the
members of the seminar for their input to the work in progress. I especially want to
thank Gene S. Gordon, M.D. and George W Kramer, Esq. for support above and
beyond the call of duty. Mistakes that are left are my own.
** Ph.D. candidate, Harvard Umversity; B.A., Tnnity College, 1974; J.D., Um-
versity of Connecticut School of Law, 1977; J.S.M., Stanford Law School, 1979; M.A.,
Harvard University, 1988.
' See mnfra notes 56 & 77-80 and accompanying text.
2 Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17 (1925).
3 J. Dewey, The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy, in Tkm INFLUENCE OF
DARwIN oN PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS IN CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT 1 (1910).
4 See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
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zo's written judicial opinions as well.5 After a brief biographical
sketch and a section placing Cardozo in historical context, this
essay will discuss Dewey's philosophy, followed by a consider-
ation of specific Cardozo decisions.
I. CARDOzo-TME MAN
Benjamin Nathan Cardozo was born in New York City in
May, 1870.6 He graduated from Columbia College at the age of
nineteen. While there, he was known to be frail and reserved
and not given to sports or socializing. He loved literature and
philosophy, and was very interested in contemporary political
movements and activities. 7
After studying for two years at Columbia Law School, Car-
dozo began the practice of law 8 He has been memorialized as
follows: "He was unfitted for any struggle where scrupulous
integrity and fine sense of what is right might be a handicap;
but judges felt the persuasive force of his legal arguments, and
lawyers and laymen sought his counsel and assistance in the
solution of intricate legal problems." 9
In 1913, Cardozo was elected a Justice of the Supreme Court
of New York. Soon thereafter, the New York Governor desig-
nated him to serve temporarily as an Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals. Early in 1917, the governor appointed him a
regular member of that court, and, later the same year, he was
elected for a term of fourteen years, having obtained the nom-
ination of both major parties. He became Chief Judge of the
New York Court of Appeals in 1926, also by joint nomination.
In 1932, President Hoover appointed him to the United States
Supreme Court to fill the vacancy left by Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr 10 Justice Cardozo died in July, 1938. The nation "mourned
his loss and paid him tribute, not only in admiration for his
See infra notes 60-63 & 70-76 and accompanying text.
Lehman, A Memorial, in SELECTED WarrIos oF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDozo
xi (M. Hall ed. 1947) [hereinafter SEICTED WRTmINs].
7Id.
&Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at xii.
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work and his character, but in affection for his great spirit."' 1
II. CARIozo IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
In the late nineteenth century, legal theory was characterized
by rigid conformity to precedent and deductive logic. The pre-
dominant way of looking at law was that legal logic was syllo-
gistic, and rules and precedents would lead the judge to a decision
by deduction. The task of the judge was to discover analytically
the right rule or precedent with which to decide a case.' 2
The beginning of the end of this formalistic approach to law
was signalled by the 1881 publication of The Common Law, by
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 3 Holmes propounded the theory
that laws were nothing more than predictions that certain con-
duct would or would not bnng a person up against the author-
ities. 14 Judges made law, they did not discover it, for it was not
"a brooding omnipresence in the sky "1- In The Path of the
Law, written in 1897, Holmes denounced syllogistic logic as the
language of the law and went on to say*
You can give any conclusion a logical form. You can
always imply a condition in a contract. But why do you imply
it? It is because of some belief as to the practice of the
community or of a class, or because of some opinion as to
policy, or, in short, because some attitude of yours upon a
matter not capable of exact quantitative measurement, and
therefore not capable of founding exact logical conclu-
sions. We do not realize how large a part of our law is
open to reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of
the public mind. 16
Thus, at the turn of the twentieth century, the conception of
what law was and how it developed was being revolutionized.
" Id.
See, e.g., E. PURCELL, THE CRisis OF DEMOCRATiC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATU-
RAnSM & TM PROBLEM OF VALUE 74-75 (1973).
0 . HoLmns, Tim COMMON LAW (1881).
" Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv L. REv. 457 (1897) ("[A] legal duty
so called is nothing, but a prediction that if a man does or emits certain things he will
be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court ").
" Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
" Holmes, supra note 73, at 466.
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The function of the judge was also being redefined as the
twentieth century dawned. Judges were seen as lawmakers who
should be responsive to social conditions. They were not ab-
solved, however, from paying due deference to tradition and
umformity of decision. The pull toward consistency in the law
formed one side of a tension; the push of progressive reform
constituted the other. The result was a unique role for the
twentieth-century judge. 17 This was the setting in which Benjamin
Nathan Cardozo assumed his judgeship.
Cardozo was influenced by Holmes, often mentiomng him
in his writings.18 Indeed, his focus on the judge as maker-of-law
was consistent with Holmes' philosophy Cardozo, however,
developed a more complete philosophy of the judge's role than
did Holmes. Whereas Holmes pondered the question, "What is
the law?", Cardozo asked himself, "What does (should) the
judge do 9 " Cardozo was self-conscious, reflective, and personal
in writing about the judicial process, while Holmes was more
traditionally "philosophical" in writing about law In this, Car-
dozo was influenced by the Legal Realism of his day
In the 1920's and 1930's, many American law professors
were joined together by a common attitude m a movement
termed "Legal Realism." Denouncing abstractions, they agpired
to analyze what was really going on in the courts. Since law
constantly changed, they did not believe that certainty or um-
formity was possible in any field of human knowledge. These
Realists believed that "Is" and "Ought'" should be temporarily
separated for purposes of analysis. 19 They called for empirical
studies of the way the law operated in society, drawing on the
methods of the newly-emerging social sciences. 20
Benjamin Cardozo called them "neorealists" out of defer-
ence to those before them "who strove to see the truth in the
workings of the judicial process, to see it steadily and whole,
17 See G. Wmmr, TORT LAW iN AMERICA: AN INTELLEcTuAL HisTo5r (1980).
"1 See, e.g., Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, in SELECTED WRrrnIosi suprd note 6,
at 77.
'9 Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Respondihg to Dean Pound, 44 HARv.
L. REv 1222, 1236-37 (1931).
2 See, e.g., E. PuRcELL, supra note 12, at 74-94; Pound, The dall for a Realist
Jurisprudence, 44 HARv. L. REv. 697 (1931); Llewellyn, supfa note 19.
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and to report what they had seen with sincerity and candor." 2'
Proponents of this view included Savigny, Jhering, Holmeg, and
Pound.22 Although Cardozo had preached a similar message,
23
he distinguished himself from the Realist movement:
What is wrong in neorealism is a tendency manifest at times
to exaggerate the indeterminacy, and entropy, the margin of
error, to treat the random or chance element as a good in
itself and a good exceeding in value the elements of certainty
and order and rational coherence-exceeding them in value,
not merely at times and in places, but always and everywhere.
In emphasizing the danger of extracting pnnciples and for-
mulas from an aggregation of specific cases and adhering to
them blindly, we must be on our guard lest we be carried over
to the other extreme and left with nothing inore coherent than
a mass of nebulous particulats.2
In the tradition of Holmes and in the context of the Legal
Realists, Cardozo tread his own middle course through the field
of early-twentieth-century legal theory.
III. DEwEY-THE MAN
John Dewey was born in 1859 in Burlington, Vermont. He
attended the University of Vermont as an undergraduate, where
he studied physiology and philosophy Aftei two years of teach-
ing high school in Pennsylvama, he enrolled at Johns Hopkins
Univergity as a graduate student m philosophy Attaimng a
Ph.D in two years, he went oit to teach at the University of
Michigan, the University of Chicago, and Columbia Umversity,
Dewey "retained Hegel's hatred of abstract, static, formal logic'' 25
and was also influenced by Darwin. Aside from his pragmatic
axiology, Dewey is remembered for his philosophy of education.
He was also ai advocate of early progressive reforms, having
befriended Jane Addams, He died in 1952.
21 Cardozo, Jurisprudence, N.Y. ST. B.A. RaT. 263, 268 (1932).
2Id.
" Id. at 270.
24 Id. at 290.
21 E. CoNicN, PuiUTANs A1b PRAGATISTS: EIGHT EMINENT AMERicAN TmNkEs
348 (1968).
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IV DEWEY-HIS IDEAS
In The Quest for Certainty, John Dewey wrote that a per-
son's distrust of himself leads to the search for true knowledge
and transcendence. 26 The quest is for "a peace which is assured,
an object which is unqualified by risk and the shadow of fear
which action casts. ' 27 Only "pure knowing," said Dewey, fulfills
the quest for complete certainty 2 A person's "highest and most
divine bliss" is a communion with unchangeable truth.29
The realm of the practical, however, brings us to the region
of changes where chance is inevitable. Perfect certainty, wrote
Dewey, "cannot be found by practical doing or making; these
take effect in an uncertain future, and involve peril, the risk of
misadventure, frustration and failure. ' ' 30 No mode of action can
ultimately satisfy this quest for absolute certainty 31
Thus Dewey rejected dogmatic rules and embraced inquiry 32
Dogmatism ignores the fact that truth comes only as the result
of experiment.3 3 In The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy,
Dewey argued that The Origin of Species had transformed the
logic of knowledge and hence the treatment of morals, politics,
and religion.34 Darwin had disrupted the "sacred ark of absolute
permanency" and had treatea forms-once regarded as fixed
and perfect-as originating and passing away 31 According to
26 J. DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY: A STUDY OF THE RELATION OF KNowl-
EDGE AND ACTION 7 (1929).
17 Id. at 8; see also B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
I was much troubled in spirit, in my first years upon the bench, to find
how trackless was the ocean on which I embarked. I sought for certainty.
I was oppressed and disheartened when I found that the quest for it was
futile. I was trying to reach land, the solid land of fixed and settled rules,
the paradise of a justice that would declare itself by tokens plainer and
more commanding than its pale and glimmering reflections in my own
vacillating mind and conscience.
Id. at 166-67.
u' J. DEwEY, supra note 26, at 8.
29 Id. at 16.
Id. at 21.
" Id. at 33.
32 Id. at 39-46.
"J. DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSY-
CHOLOGY 237 (1950).
34 J. Dewey, supra note 3.
11 Id. at 1-2.
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Dewey, the genuine issue was not "whether certain values, as-
sociated with traditions and institutions, have Being already...,
but what concrete judgments we are to form about ends and
means in the regulation of practical behavior."3 6
Dewey did not focus on results, but on methods of action. 37
The Darwiman orientation was that knowledge was to be ob-
tained "through deliberate institution of a definite and specified
course of change." '38 The method of physical inquiry, reversing
"[t]he conceptions that had reigned the philosophy of nature
and knowledge for two thousand years," ' 39 introduced change to
order so that correlative changes could be observed.
Dewey explained that experimental inquiry had three out-
standing charactenstics: 40 1) all experimentation involves overt
doing; 2) experiment is not random, but directed by ideas; and
3) the outcome is "the construction of a new empirical situation
in which objects are differently related to one another "41
Thus, the aim of science became "discovery of constant relations
among changes in place of definition of objects immutable be-
yond the possibility of alteration." 42 Principles, then, are hy-
potheses for experimentation and testing. 43
John Dewey realized what faces one who seeks absolute
certainty,
With the surrender of unchangeable substances having prop-
erties fixed in isolation and unaffected by interactions, must
go the notion that certainty is attained by attachment to fixed
objects with fixed characters. For not only are no such objects
found to exist, but the very nature of experimental method,
namely, definition by operations that are interactions, implies
that such things are not capable of being known. Henceforth
the quest for certainty becomes the search for methods of
control; that is, regulation of conditions of change with respect
to their consequences."
6 J. DEWEY, supra note 26, at 46.
, Id. at 36.
" Id. at 84.
J. Dewey, supra note 3, at 1.
40 J. DEWEY, supra note 26, at 86.
41 Id.
41 Id. at 102.
41 J. DEwEY, supra note 33, at 239.
" J. DEWEY, supra note 26, at 128.
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Born the year that The Origin of Species was published, Dewey
was a Darwiman philosophically
V L JEGAL LoGIC
In Logical Method and Law, John Dewey outlined a logic
that was "empirical and concrete. ' 45 Dewey explained, "If we
trust to an experimental logic, we find that general pnnciples
emerge as statements of generic ways in which it has been found
helpful to treat concrete cases." 46 The meaning and worth of a
general statement is "subject to inquiry and revision in view of
what happens, what the consequences are, when it is used as a
method of treatment. ' 47
No lawyer, said Dewey, ever thought out d client's case in
terms of the syllogism. Rather, lawyers begin with an intended
cohclusion (favorable to the client) and analyze the facts so as
to construct the most favorable picture. While doing this, they
research recorded cases that are arguably similar, looking for
rules to substantiate their interpretation of the facts. As research
continues, lawyek shift emphasis and perspective on the facts;
dnd as additional facts are encountered, lawyers modify their
selection of the rules of law upon which they rely 48
Logical systematization is indispensable to the lawyer, but
not ultimate. It is a means, not an end. General principles inform
and clarify the inquiry preceding oncrete decisions. "It is most
important that rules 6f law should form as coherent generalized
logical systems as pdsgible," 49 reducing numerous cases to a few
general principles that fit t6gether as a whole. However, while
consistent generalizations may hblp a particular student, it "is
clearly in last resort subsdrvient to the e~onormcal and effective
reaching of decisions in particular cases." 50
In response to Justice Holmes' generalization that "the whole
outline of the law is the resultant of a conflict at every point
41 Deweyj supra note 2, at 19.
4 "Id. at 22.
Id. at 22-23.
Id. dt 23.
I4 d. at 19;
so Id.
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between logic and good sense," ' 51 Dewey argued that Holmes'
decried logic was "formal consistency, consistency of concepts
with one another irrespective of the consequences of their ap-
plication to concrete matters-of-fact. ' 52 When Holmes spud the
life of the law had not been logic, he equated logic with the
syllogism. 53 Dewey's logic was quite different. Rather than being
a logic of rigid demonstration, Dewey chose a logic of search
and discovery Dewey's experimental logic used "methods of
reaching intelligent decisions in concrete situations, or meth-
ods employed in adjusting disputed issues in behalf of the public
and enduring interest. '54
General legal rules and principles were working hypotheses
for Dewey, and they needed to be constantly tested by applica-
tion to concrete situations. The implications for the logic of
judicial decisions were revolutiqnxy"
They indicate either that logi 9 must be abandoned or that it
must bp a logic relative to consequences rather than to ante-
cedents, a logic of prediction of probabilities rather than one
of deduction of certainties. For the purposes of a logic of
inquiry into probable consequences, general principles can only
be tools justified by the work they do. They re means of
intellectual survey, analysis, and insight into the factors of the
situation to be dealt with. Like qther tools they mpst be
modified when they are applied to new conditions and new
results have to be achieved.51
It is difficult to know whether Benjamila Qardozo ever read
Logical Method and Law, bpt he did cite The Quest for Cer-
tainty and Human Nature and Conduct in his extrajudicial Writ-
ings, often qV9ting John Dewey 56 Let us turn now to specific
opimons written by Judge Cardozo, keeping an eye upon his
philosophy and Dewey's influence.
1' Id. at 20.
52 Id.
Holmes, Book Review, 14 AM. L, Rv 233, 233-34 (i880).
, Dewey, supra note 2, at 21.
" Id. at 26.
Cardozo, supra note 22, at 283; see also B. CARnozo, THE GROWTH OF THE
LAW 65-67, 130 (1924).
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VI. CAs1s
A. Jacob & Young, Inc. v Kent 7
Jacob & Youngs, Inc. built a country residence (valued at
$77,000) for Kent, who refused to pay the balance owed of
$3,483.46 because he was riot happy with the house. Their con-
tract specified, with regard t6 piumbing, that "all wrought iron
pipe must be well galvanized, lap welded pipe of the grade
know%'n as 'standard pipe' of Reading manufacture." 58 Nine
months after occupying the house, Kent noticed that some of
the pipe was not Reading, but the product of other factories.
Insisting upon exact performance, he wanted Reading pipes sub-
stituted. The problem was that most of the plumbing was en-
cased in the walls, which would have to be demolished at great
expense. Jacob & Youngs would not tear the house down, and
instead asked for a certificate that the final payment was due.
In writing the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals,
Judge Cardozo pointed out that in this case the substitution of
Cohoes for Reading pipe was neither fraudulent nor willful. The
only distinction between Reading and Cohoes pipe was the name.
Even Kent's architect failed to pick up the error when inspecting
the pipe after its arrival. The trial judge had not allowed any
evidence regarding the comparative quality of the two kinds of
pipe and directed a verdict for Kent. The Appellate Division
reversed the judgment and granted a new trial, whereupon Kent
appealed to Cardozo's court.59
Writing that this case involved the distinction between both
promises and conditions, and independent and dependent prom-
ises, Judge Cardozo commented upon the haziness of the lines
between these concepts: "Those who think more of symmetry
and logic in the development of legal rules than of practical
adaptation to the attainment of a just result will be troubled by
classification where the lines of division are so wavering and
blurred. '" 0° The desire for consistency and certainty prompts
S7 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
I d. at 890.
I d.
10 Id. at 891.
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judges to honor the stficter standard of precedent. But when
courts balance those consideratiis against equity and fairness,
the latter consideration§ Win out, especially in the state of New
York, where the "liberal view" prevailed. "Where the line is to
be drawn between the important and the trivial cannot be settled
by a formula." 6'
Cardozo was quick to point out that a builder has no general
license to use materials which are "just as good.''62 The questikn
was one of degree, wheie the jury and the judge had to look at
both the sigmficance of the discrepancy and the cost of redoing
the work. He therefore ruled that the decision in favor of Jacob
& Youngs should be upheld, explaimng that "the rule that gives
a remedy in cases of substantial performance with compensation
for defects of trivial or inappreciable importance, has been de-
veloped by the courts as an instrument of justice. '63
Writing later, Cardozo said that courts in these cases have
trouble squaring their justice with their logic. The rule of sub-
stantial performance which emerged from Jacob & Youngs v
Kent was inspired by a "mere sentiment of justice.'' 64 That
having become a rule, judges have surrounded it "with the halo
of conformity to precedent.''65
Justice reacted upon logic, sentiment upon reason, by guiding
the choice to be made between one logic and another. Reason
in its turn reacted upon sentiment by purging it of what is
arbitrary,-by checking it when it might otherwise have been
extravagant, by relating it to method and order and coherence
and tradition .6
Cardozo thus employed experimental logic a' la Dewey- the
choice was of methods.
61 Id.
- Id. (citing language in Easthampton Lumber & Coal Co., Ltd. v. Worthington,
79 N.E, 323, 325 (N.Y. 1906)).
63 Id. at 892.
", B. CAR ozo, supra note 27, at 44.
6 Id. at 45.
6 Id.
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B. Hynes v New York Central R.R. Co. 67
On July 8, 1916, sixteen year old Harvey Hynes swam with
two friends across the Harlem River, a navigable stream, from
the Manhattan side to the Bronx side. The New York Central
Railroad Company had a right of way on the Bronx side for
trains operated by high tension wires strung on poles Prd cros-
sarms. Extending from the Railroad's bulkhead above the river
was a plank used for diving. One end of the plank was lodged
under a rock on the Railroad's land, and nails had been driven
at the point of contact with the bulkhead. Seven and one-half
feet of the board projected beyond the line of the Railroad's
property and above the public waterway 68
As Hynes stood poised, preparing to dive, a crossarm with
electric wires fell from a pole and struqk him, casting him to his
death in the waters below His mother sued t1p Railroad for
damages. The lower courts ruled that Hynes was a trespasser on
the Railroad's land. Judge Cardozo, however, noted that "the
board itself was a trespass, an encroachment on the public
ways. ' 69 He said that Hynes would have met the same fate had
lAe been below the plank and not above it. The conclusion that
lIlynes was a trespasser and was therefore not entitled to damages
had, in the lower courts, been "defended with much sublety of
reasomng, with much insistence upon its inevitableness as a
merely logical deduction." 70 A majority of Cardozo's cqurt,
however, was unable to accept it as a conclusion of law 71
According to Judge Cardozo, bathers in the Harlem River
on the day of the disaster were enjoying a public highway and
were entitled to reasonable protection from the Railroad's wires.
"They did not cease to be bathers entitled to the same protection
while they were diving from encroaching objects gr engaging in
the sports that are common among swimmers." ' 72 Presuming that
the Railroad would dqny liability if the same plank had been
only a few inches above the w ter, as opposed to a few feet,
- 131 N.E. 898 (N.Y. 1921).
" Id. at 898-99.
"1 Id. at 899.
70 Id.
71 Id.
7 Id.
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Judge Cardozo, in the opimon of the New York Court of
Appeals, declared: "Duties are thus supposed to arise and to be
extinguished in alternate zones or strata."73 The court concluded
that Hynes was in the enjoyment of public-waters and under
cover of their protection even when preparing to dive.
Cardozo opined that the Hynes case was a striking instance
of the dangers of "a jurisprudence of conceptions" 74-"the
extension of a maxim or a definition with relentless disregard of
consequences to a 'dryly logical extreme. ' ' 75 Where, as here,
structures and ways are superimposed on each other, "there is
little help in pursuing general maxims to ultimate conclu-
sions They must be reformulated and readapted to meet
exceptional conditions. '"7 6 Considerations of analogy, conven-
ience, policy, and justice supported an award of damages to
Hynes' mother.
In The Growth of the Law, Benjamin Cardozo wrote that
no process of merely logical deduction would have determined
whether the plank was part of the Railroad's land or not.
There had arisen a new situation which could not force itself
without mutilation into any of the existing moulds. When we
find a situation of this kind, the choice that will approve itself
to this judge or to that, will be determined largely by his
conception of the end of the law, the function of legal liability;
and this question of ends and functions is a question of phi-
losophy 77
This is similar to John Dewey saying that the syllogism is not
and should not be the logic of law Sounding much like Dewey,
Judge Cardozo went on to say that "all methods are not idols,"
but "tools. 78 Cardozo explained "We must test one of them
by the others, supplementing and re-enforcing where there is
weakness, so that what is strong and best in each will be at our
7' Id.
74 Id. at 900 (citing language in Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L.
REV 605, 610 (1908)).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 B. CARDozo, supra note 56, at I00-01.
78 Id. at 103.
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service in the hour of need. ' 79 This "natural selection of meth-
ods" is specifically set forth by Dewey in Logical Method and
Law 80
Cardozo expanded upon the "jurisprudence of conceptions" 8'
that he referred to in Hynes: "A fruitful parent of injustice is
the tyranny of concepts. They are tyrants rather than servants
when treated as real existences and developed with merciless
disregard of consequences to the limit of their logic."82 Rather,
we should treat concepts as hypotheses subject to modification
depending upon their outcome.
C. In re Rouss13
To some extent, wrote Cardozo, ends and functions are
coterminous.
Our philosophy will tell us the proper function of law in telling
us the ends that law should endeavor to attain; but closely
related to such a study is the inquiry whether law, as it has
developed in this subject or in that, does in truth fulfill its
function-is functioing well or ill.84
This is followed by a quotation from In re Rouss. 5
Jacob Rouss had been the attorney for a member of the
New York City police force accused of collecting bribes from
Sipp, the keeper of a disorderly house. Rouss and Sipp's attorney
arranged for Sipp to be paid to stay out of the state. Five police
inspectors were later indicted for conspiring to obstruct justice
by suppressing Sipp's testimony At their trial, Rouss was a
prosecution witness. After his testimony, which was essentially
a confession of guilt, Rouss was threatened with disbarment for
professional misconduct.
Rouss argued that he was immune from discipline pursuant
to section 584 of the New York Penal Law,8 6 which provided
79Id.
Dewey, supra note 2, at 19-20.
sI See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
B. CARwozo, Tim P~ARAox.s oF LEoAL ScIENcE 61 (1928).
116 N.E. 782 (N.Y. 1917).
' B. CARwozo, supra note 56, at 112.
116 N.E. 782.
Id. at 783.
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that no person should be prosecuted or subject to penalty or
forfeiture on the basis of his own testimony regarding violations
of that law The issue, wrote Judge Cardozo, was whether
disbarment was a "penalty or forfeiture" as intended by the
statute.87
Cardozo found that membership in the bar was a "privilege
burdened with conditions, ' 8 8 one of which was a fair private
and professional character If the condition was broken, the
privilege was lost. The examination into character was "merely
a test of fitness. To strike the unworthy lawyer from the roll
[was] not to add to the pains and penalties of cnme." ' 9 With a
clear focus on how the law was to function, Cardozo exclaimed:
"We will not declare, unless driven to it by sheer necessity, that
a confessed criminal has been entrenched by the very confession
of guilt beyond the power of removal." 9 Cardozo buttressed his
opinion on a finding that a disbarment proceeding was not a
criminal case-a case with which forfeitures and penalties were
associated.
Cardozo further stated that the immunity of section 584 of
the Penal Law was only as broad as the constitutional privilege.
Disbarment was not within the exemption. This ruling, he said,
was well-supported by precedent and reason. He then wrote the
words quoted in The Growth of the Law"9' "Consequences
cannot alter statutes, but may help to fix their meaning. Statutes
must be so construed, if possible, that absurdity and mischief
may be avoided."' 2 Like physicians, lawyers had "the right to
purify their membership and vindicate their honor. . The
knave and criminal may pose as a minister of justice. Such
things cannot have been intended, and will not be allowed. ' 93
Thus, Cardozo stressed ends and functions in what he called
the method of sociology This approach, like Dewey's testing of
hypotheses, asked, "How does the precept work? Is it a sensible
87 Id.
a Id.
9 Id.
9Id.
91 B. CARwozo, supra note 56, at 112.
9 Rouss, 116 N.E. at 785.
91 Id. at 786.
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rule for the governance of mankind?" 94 This sociological method
of deciding cases had rarely been employed prior to Cardozo's
tenure on the bench. He was one of its foremost advocates.
D MacPherson v Buick Motor Co.95
The Buick Motor Company manufactured and sold an au-
tomobile to a retail dealer, who sold it to MacPherson. While
he was driving the car, it collapsed because one of the wheels
was made of defective wood and its spokes broke into pieces.
MacPherson was thrown out of the car and injured.
Although the manufacturer had not made the wheel, it could
have discovered the defects by inspection. However, the manu-
facturer did not perform an inspection. The question, as framed
by Judge Cardozo, was "whether the defendant owed a duty of
care and vigilance to anyone but the immediate purchaser." 96
In 1916, most American courts still followed the English rule
of Winterbottom v Wright97 that those having no privity of
contract could not be awarded damages on the basis of the
contract. 98 In New York, Thomas v Winchester9 marked an
exception to the overarching rule of privity by holding the man-
ufacturer of a falsely labelled poison liable to the person poi-
soned even though the drug was supplied by a pharmacist. The
theory was that the defendant's negligence put human life in
"imminent danger "100
Judge Cardozo traced later cases that extended the rule (ex-
ception) of Thomas v Winchester and bluntly stated that if
there had been such an extension, the New York Court of
Appeals was committed to it. These cases, he wrote, constitute
"the trend of judicial thought."'' 1
The court, through Cardozo, held that:
94 B. CAnozo, supra note 56, at 113.
- 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
Id. at 1051.
152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
See id. at 403 ("The party who made the contract alone may sue.").
" 6 N.Y. 381 (1852).
110 Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 403.
10, MacPherson, Ii N.E. at 1052.
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[Tihe pnnciple of Thomas v Winchester is not limited to
poisons, explosives, and things of like nature, to things which
in their normal operation are implements of destruction. If the
nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place
life and limb in peril when negligently made, then it is a thing
of danger. 10 2
Cardozo's opimon "relaxed the [imminent danger] requirement
to include cases where the defendant did not know but should
have known the danger."' 13 The peril came when the thing was
"negligently made"-not because of the danger in and of the
thing itself. Cardozo continued:
Its nature gives warmng of the consequences to be expected.
If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the
thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and
used without new tests, then, irreslfective of contract, the
manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make
it carefully 104
There must be knowledge that danger is probable and that, in
the usual course of events, the danger will be shared by persons
other than the buyer. Applying this standard to the facts of the
MacPherson case, Judge Cardozo found that the nature of an
automobile gave warning of probable danger "if its construction
is defective.' '105 The car in question was designed to go fifty
miles an hour; injury was almost certain unless the wheels were
sound and strong.
Revealing his philosophy of law, Cardozo noted that prece-
dents taken from the days of the stage coach did not fit the
conditions of travel in 1916. "The principle that the danger must
be imminent does not change, but the things subject to the
principle do change. They are whatever the needs of life in a
developing civilization require them to be."' 06
MacPherson v Buick Motor Co. and its expansion of man-
ufacturer's liability to persons other than the direct purchaser
,02 Id. at 1053.
103 See James, Products Liability, 34 TEx. L. REv 61 (1955).
,04 MacPherson, III N.E. at 1053.
103 Id.
106 Id.
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have been the subject of much scholarly comment. 107 The expan-
sion has been referred to as the "MacPherson doctrine," and
by 1957 it was almost universally accepted. 10 8 William Prosser
characterized the import of MacPherson as follows: "Cardozo,
wielding a mighty axe, burst over the ramparts, and buried the
general rule under the exception . During the suceeding [sic]
years this decision swept the country no American jurisdic-
tion now refuses to accept it. The rule of the MacPherson case
was extended by degrees."' 19 Karl Llewellyn has called Mac-
Pherson "a classic example of how a troubling sequence of cases
can be handled in argument."" 10 Llewellyn noted that using the
"Style of Reason,""' Cardozo invoked one of his best patterns.
Extracting a principle from past authority, Cardozo "re-for-
mulated it to fit the modern need, to solve the case at hand,
and to guide the future,"" 2 all the while dealing with intervemng
authorities. For Llewellyn, and indeed for Cardozo, the idea
that principles must be recurred to constantly (to correct and
readjust precedent) was vital.
Cardozo considered MacPherson in The Nature of the Ju-
dicial Process in 1921. He said that the conclusion of the ma-
jority of the court (the majority consisted of four of the seven
judges) was evidence of a "spirit and a tendency to subordinate
precedent to justice." ' 3
How to reconcile that tendency, which is growing and in the
main a wholesome one, with the need of uniformity and cer-
tainty, is one of the great problems confronting the lawyers
and judges of our day We shall have to feel our way here as
elsewhere in the law Somewhere between worship of the past
and exaltation of the present the path of safety will be found." 4
107 See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
"I Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN.
L. REv 963, 965 (1957).
,o9 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YAiE L.J. 1099, 1100 (1960).
110 K. LLEWELLYN, TIE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 430 (1960).
'" Id. at 431.
112 Id.
113 B. C~ARozo, supra note 27, at 160.
114 rd.
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Throughout his works, Cardozo spoke of a middle way-be-
tween uniformity and individuality, precedent and justice, rest
and motion, immutable principles and hypotheses, discovery of
fixed principles and creation of modifiable standards. Not an
absolute idealist and not a strict empiricist, he continually spoke
of walking the razor's edge.
Even though MacPherson was an important decision, the
judges of the New York Court of Appeals did not totally over-
throw all previous law when they decided it. Writing of the case
in 1924, Cardozo said that MacPherson's conclusion was "drawn
from a stock of principles and rules which [were] treated as
invested with legal obligation." 15 Cardozo continued: "The court
will not roam at large, and light upon one conclusion or another
as the result of favor or caprice. This stock of rules and prin-
ciples is what for most purposes we mean by law ,1116 As one
commentator noted: "In the language of Professor John Dewey,
whom [Cardozo] frequently cited with admiration, the judicial
process involves a series of imagined experimentations, in terms
of operations (facts implying legal consequences) which must be
'compossible' with the principles of the legal system.1 1 7
MacPherson is an example of Cardozo striving to walk the "path
of safety""' of which he so eloquently wrote.
E. Klein v Maravelas"9 and Sun Printing & Publishing
Association v Remington Paper & Power Co.'°
The issue in Klein v Maravelas was whether the sales in
bulk law'2' was valid under the United States and New York
constitutions. A similar law had been declared unconstitutional
by the New York Court of Appeals in Wright v Hart.'2 The
Wright court held that the enactment violated the federal con-
"' B. CARDozo, supra note 56, at 43.
,16 Id.
' Patterson, Cardozo's Philosophy of Law, 88 U. PA. L. Rav. 71, 90 (1939).
' B. CA Dozo, supra note 27, at 160.
' 114 N.E. 809 (N.Y. 1916).
,' 139 N.E. 470 (N.Y. 1923).
'2 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law, § 44 (1914) (current version at N.Y.U.C.C. Law § 6-101
to -112 (McKinney 1964 & West Supp. 1989)).
' 75 N.E. 404 (N.Y. 1905).
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stitution in denying equal protection of the laws to merchants
and violated both the federal and state constitutions in imposing
arbitrary restrictions on liberty of contract. The court was closely
divided, with three judges vigorously dissenting.
The same issue was to be decided anew in Klein by the same
court. Judge Cardozo, who wrote the opinion, began by stating
that since Wright v Hart, comparable statutes had been upheld
in two cases by the United States Supreme Court.'2 Therefore,
concluded Cardozo, the current sales in bulk law was not vio-
lative of the United States Constitution.
As to the New York constitution, Cardozo frankly wrote:
"We think it is our duty to hold that the decision in Wfight v
Hart is wrong."'12 His reasoning was that the "all but unam-
mous voice of the judges of the land, in federal and state courts
alike, has upheld the constitutionality of these laws."'12 Cardozo
continued: "At the time of Wright, such laws were new and
strange" and most thought them to be "the fitful prejudices of
the hour.' ' 26 By 1916, however, similik laws were on the books
in all states. Cardozo followed this by citation to twenty-six
cases in which like statutes were held constitutionally valid. 27
"In such circumstances we can no longer say, whatever past
views may have been, that the prohibitions of this statute are
arbitrary and purposeless restrictions upon liberty of con-
tract."' 128 Thus, Judge Cardozo explained why he so jettisoned
precedent.
The needs of successive generations may make restrictions
imperative today which were vain and capricious to the vision
of times past. Back of this legislation, which to a majority
of the judges who decided Wright v Hart seemed arbitrary
and purposeless, there must have been a real need. We can see
this now, even though it may have been obscure before. Our
"I Klein, 114 N.E. at 810 (Lemieux v. Young, Trustee, 211 U.S. 489 (U.S. 1909)
(Connecticut bulk sales law constitutional); Kidd, Date, and Pnce Co. v. MusselIman
Grocer Co., 217 U.S. 461 (U.S. 1910) (Michigan Sales-in-Bulk Act of 1905 constitu-
tional)).
124 Id. at 810.
12 Id.
16 Id. (citing Wright v. Hart, 75 N.E. 404, 408-09 (N.Y. 1905)).
127 Id.
123 Id.
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past decision ought not to stand in opposition to the uniform
convictions of the entire judiciary of the land. Least of all
should it stand when rendered by a closely divided court against
the earnest protest of distinguished judges. 129
He concluded by saying that the 1916 law was distinguishable
from the 1904 law and the constitutionality of the 1916 law
could be so justified. But the diffenng details were "'in reality
trifling" and Cardozo thought it better for the court to be honest
and simply reverse Wright v Hart.'30
Speaking of Klein in The Nature of the Judicial Processi
Cardozo said that the rule of adherence to precedent ought not
to be abandoned, but relaxed. "I think that when a rule, after
it haA been duly tested by expenence, has been found to be
inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare,
there should be less hesitation in frank avowal and full aban-
donment." '' 3' Judges, opined Cardozo, ought not to tie the hnds
of their successors because mores change or may be misinter-
preted.' 32
In The Growth of the Law, Cardozo wrote: "To keep the
balance true, let me put before you other cases where certainty
was found to be the larger good when mobility was weighed
against it.' 3' He then launched into a discussion of Sun Printing
& Publishing Association v Remington Paper & Power -Co."1 4
Sun Printing agreed to buy, and Remington Paper agreed to
sell, 1,000 tons of paper per month between Septembr, 1919
and December, 1920. Specifications of the paper were agreed
upon, as was time of payment. Regarding prices and how long
they would be effective, the agreement read:
For the balance of the penod of this agreement the price
of the paper and length of terms for which such price shall
apply shall be agreed upon by and between the parties hereto
fifteen days prior to the expiration of each penod for which
the pnce and length of term thereof have been previously
Id. at 810-811.
130 Id. at 811.
,' B. CARnozo, supra note 27, at 150.
"1 Id. at 152.
" B. CARDozo, supra note 56, at 109.
" 139 N.E. 470 (N.Y. 1923).
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agreed upon, said price in no event to be ugher than the
contract price for newsprint charged by the Canadian Export
Paper Company to the large consumers, the seller to receive
the benefit of any differentials in freight rates.'
This clause became the center of dispute when the buyer and
the seller disagreed as to prices and their duration.
Writing the opimon of the New York Court of Appeals,
Judge Cardozo pointed out that the parties attempted to protect
themselves from the contingency of failing to reach agreement
on price, but that they did not guard against the contingency of
failing to reach agreement as to time. He concluded that the
result was not a contract but an "'agreement to agree ' " '36 at
some future time.
Rejecting the suggestion that the defendant was under a duty
to accept reasonable terms according to the nature of the trans-
action and the practice of the business (in lieu of a term defi-
mtely spelled out by the contract), Cardozo refused to "make
the contract over. ' 13 7 Judges, he wrote, were "not at liberty to
revise while professing to construe." 13 8 Judgment, therefore, was
for the defendant, Remington Paper
This was a case, according to Cardozo, "where advantage
had been taken of the strict letter of a contract to avoid an
onerous engagement.' ' 39 A "sensitive conscience" might have
aborted such an attempt, but the New York Court of Appeals
"thought this immateial.' 40
The court subordinated the equity of a particular situation to
the overmasterng need of certainty in the transactions of
commercial life. The end to be attained in the development of
the law of contract is the supremacy of will outwardly
revealed in the spoken or the written word. The loss to business
would in the long run be greater than the gain if judges were
clothed with power to revise as well as to interpret. [T]he
'" Id. at 470.
23 Id. at 471.
137 Id.
138 Id.
"3 B. CARnozo, supra note 56, at 110.
140 Id.
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current axiology still places stability and certainty in the fore-
front of the virtues.' 4'
Other cases where the interest of certainty predominated could
be cited, said Cardozo, "without number.' ' 42
Klein and Sun Printing present a point-counterpoint between
relaxation of precedent and upholding uniformity. The tension
between them illustrates the "middle way" which Cardozo at-
tempted to stride:
In our worship of certainty, we must distinguish between the
sound certainty and the sham, between what is gold and what
is tinsel; and then, when certainty is attained, we must remem-
ber that it is not the only good; that we can buy it at too high
a price; that there is danger in perpetual quiescence as well as
in perpetual motion; and that a compromise must be found in
a principle of growth.' 43
Just as legal rules and principles were working hypotheses for
John Dewey, so was the interest of certainty for Benjamin
Cardozo, and it had to be constantly tested by application to
concrete situations.
F Yome v. Gorman'44
In The Paradoxes of Legal Science, Benjamin Cardozo gives
a citation to John Dewey after the following: "The jural as well
as the moral norm, has in it an infusion of qualities with which
justice is at times contrasted, such as charity or compassion.' ' 45
Immediately preceding is a reference to Yome v Gorman.'"
In Yome, the issue was whether a widow could disinter the
body of her husband, who had received the sacrament of last
' Id. at 110-11.
"' Id. at iii. See, e.g., Murray v. Cunard S.S., 139 N.E. 226, 228 (N.Y. 1923)
(court upheld a ticket contract that placed a time limit of 40 days after debarkation for
a passenger to provide the steamship company with written notice of personal injury)
("If claims may be presented at any time ., the opportunity for investigation will
often be lost.").
', B. CARDozo, supra note 56, at 16-17.
152 N.E. 126 (N.Y. 1926).
"' B. CARDozo, supra note 82, at 39-40.
,4 152 N.E. 126.
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rites and had been buried in a Roman Catholic cemetery The
rules and regulations of the Bishop of the Diocese of Brooklyn
prohibited disinterment if the body were to be buried in a non-
Catholic resting ground. Anna Yome, however, contended that
her husband had not been that religious; that they had intended
the plot to be a temporary place of burial; and that she and her
husband had wanted to be buried close to each other. Thus, she
was granted a preliminary injunction restraimng the Diocese
from interfering with his disinterment.
Called upon to determine the validity of the injunction,
Judge Cardozo said that the issue could be resolved only by
weighing "conflicting inferences of duty and propriety "47 The
wishes of wife and kin, he wrote, are not supreme and final
"when the body has been laid to rest, and the aid of equity is
invoked to disturb the quiet of the grave."' 48 The task was to
balance the wishes of the deceased, the motives and feelings of
the survivors, and the sentiments and usages of the religious
body which conferred the rite of burial. Another consideration
was that the dead are not to be disturbed without reason of
substance.
Characterizing his approach to the issue, Cardozo said that
the Court of Appeals was not declaring a rule, but exemplifying
a process. None of the considerations mentioned were to be
applied absolutely All were subject to neutralization by the
others. In the final analysis: "Right must then be done as right
would be conceived of by men of character and feeling.' 1 49
tardozo concluded that a case for an injunction had not been
made out as a matter of right upon 'uncontroverted facts. A trial
court would have to balance the considerations he had set forth,
and any others it felt applicable.
The characterization of the court's approach in Yome as a
"process" rather than a "rule" is quite Dewey-esque. Darwiman
laboratory science-directed experimentation-did not deal m
absolutes; it dealt with method, or process. In Yome, Cardozo
was not deducing a result from standards engraved in stone.
147 Id. at 128.
'4 Id.
,49 Id. at 129.
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Rather, he was outlining a method for decision-a process of
weighing and balancing the competing considerations. Here, Car-
dozo was employing experimental logic.
G. Epstein v Gluckn'5o
One way in which judges may keep in touch with the mores
of the time and the currents of legal thought is by reading legal
commentaries. There they may find "the treasures buried in the
law reviews." 15' These periodicals published by law schools may
in fact "guide the course of judgment.1152 Cardozo's willingness
to consider these "treasures ' '1 53 of legal scholarship was dem-
onstrated in the case of Epstein v. Gluckn.'54
In Epstein v Gluckn, the defendant, Rose Gluckin, made a
contract to sell a house and lot in Brooklyn to Weinstein and
Joblin for $12,550, to be paid partly in cash and partly by way
of purchase-money bond and mortgage. Weinstein and Joblip
assigned their interest under the contract to Epstein, the plaintiff.
When the vendor refused to convey, Epstein brought suit for
specific performance. The lower court ruled for Epstein, but the
Appellate Division reversed, a result, according to Cardozo,
which was "a deduction from cases which have conditioned relief
in equity upon mutuality of remedy "15 Cardozo added: "We
think the deduction must be rejected as unsound.'" 6
In an opinion for the court, Cardozo found that "It]he
assignee of such a contract succeeds by force of the assignment
to the position of the original vendee,"' 5 7 with all the attendant
rights and duties. Thus, the court held that specific performance
was available not only to Weinstein and Joblin, but also to
Epstein. Before citing four commentaries and a number of cases,
Cardozo wrote:
,' 135 N.E. 861 (N.Y. 1922).
" B. CAmozo, supra note 56, at 14.
" Id.
" Id.
114 135 N.E. 861.
"I Id. at 861.
1' Id.
15 Id.
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If there ever was a rule that mutuality of remedy existing, not
merely at the time of the decree, but at the time of the
formation of the contract, is a conditioh of equitable relief, it
has been so qualified by exceptions that, viewed as a precept
of general validity, it has ceased to be a rule to-day [sic].' 58
Cardozo said that the purpose of the old mutuality of remedy
rule was the assurance that neither injustice nor oppression
would operate against the plaintiff or the defendant. Although
the formula was an attempt to insure equal justice, it had
outlived its usefulness. Cardozo concluded: "We may not suffer
it to petrify at the cost of its ammating principle."' 15 9 Thus, the
New York Court of Appeals decided in favor of Epstein.
Writing about Epstein v. Gluckin in The Growth of the Law,
Cardozo expressed the belief that had the university professors
not written their commentaries, the rule of mutuality of remedy
"would have been extended by a process of purely logical de-
duction, and things would have gone from bad to worse."' 60
Epstein v. Gluckin was a reconsideration of the whole issue and
a change consistent with equity and justice. "Without the critical
labors of Ames and Lewis and Stone and Williston, the heresy,
instead of dying out, would probably have persisted, and even
spread.' 161 Indeed, criticism from without "saved the day ,162
So had the openness of Dewey's experimental method.
CONCLUSION
Arthur Corbin wrote of Cardozo:
[H]e molds doctrine without repudiating it. In his judicial
process, Cardozo draws from the very wellsprings and foun-
tainheads, and pours forth the living draught in a liquid style
that sparkles with his own incomparable charm and personal-
ity
All this does not mean that Cardozo is building a new
system of law No one knows better than he that even a
" ' Id. at 862.
159 Id.
110 B. CAnozo, supra note 56, at 14.
161 Id. at 15-16.
"I Id. at 16.
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Cardozo can do no such thing. He is making an existing system
work well in new cases as they arise. He is taking the past,
indeed well-learned and well-respected, and molding it to serve
the ends that it has always served. It is true that he does not
leave it unaffected and unchanged in the process. So it has
always been with other judges, great and small. Such is indeed
the Natiure of the Judicial Process. 63
Benjamin Cardozo was remarkable for his style of clarity and
beauty He also stands out as a philosopher among judge; and
as one who very self-consciously applied his philosophy to his
judicial work.
Cardozo believed in the survival of the fittest logic-of the
best method for deciding a case. Law moves inch by inch, like
a glacier, and is in a state of "endless becoming."1 64 Rules of
decision are tools, hypotheses subject to future modification, as
John Dewey proclaimed. The process is one of trial and error,
testing and retesting, ebb and flow. Philosophy of law, wrote
Cardozo, teaches us a great commandment: "Thou shalt not
make unto thyself any graven image-of maxims or formulas to
wit. 1 65
Dewey said that fixed objects with fixed characters cannot
be known. Cardozo often wrote in his decisions that if he were
to deduce a guiding rule from those fixed, the result would have
been oppressive or unjust. John Dewey also rejected use of the
syllogism in law and instead proposed experimental logic. Car-
dozo believed that the "juristic philosophy of the common law
is at bottom the philosophy of pragmatism. Its truth is relative,
not absolute."'' However, he warned that "we must not sacri-
fice the general to the particular, [or] throw to the winds
the advantages of consistency and uniformity"1 67 in the name of
doing justice in the instance. "We must keep within those inter-
stitial limits which precedent and custom and the long and silent
" Corbin, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Contracts, 52 HARv L. Rv 408,
438-39 (1939).
"4 B. CARnozo, supra note 27, at 27-28.
"4 B. CARozo, supra note 56, at 107-08 (quoting Pollock, A Plea for Historcal
Interpretation, 39 LAw Q. REv. 163, 169 (1923)).
'" B. CAnozo, supra note 27, at 102.
161 Id. at 103.
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and almost indefinable practice of other judges through the
centuries of the common law have set to judge-made rnnova-
tions."' 161 In these ways did Benjamin Nathan Cardozo profess
and live by ar experimental logic.
16s Id.
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